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Term limits and electoral accountability

Smart, Michael; Sturm, Daniel M.
Fonte: Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science Publicador: Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science
Tipo: Monograph; NonPeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /07/2006 Português
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Periodic elections are the main instrument through which voters can hold politicians accountable. From this perspective term limits, which restrict voters’ ability to reward politicians with re-election, appear counterproductive. We show that despite the disciplining effect of elections, term limits can be ex ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters. By reducing the value of holding office term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private preferences. Such “truthful” behavior by incumbents in turn results in better screening of incumbents. We show that the combination of these two effects can strictly increase the utility of voters.

Book review: that obscured subject of violence

Kirby, Paul
Fonte: Palgrave Macmillan Publicador: Palgrave Macmillan
Tipo: Article; NonPeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /04/2010 Português
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An extended book review of Slavoj Zizek's 2008 book 'On Violence', published as part of a special issue on Slavoj Zizek and Political Subjectivity, in Subjectivity: International Journal of Critical Psychology, 3(1), April 2010

Myths and meanings of voting power : comments on a symposium

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /01/2001 Português
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These are comments on the Symposium 'Power Indices and the European Union' in the July 1999 issue of this Journal. We point out several common inter-connected confusions and errors concerning the meaning of voting power. We stress the vital distinction between two different intuitive notions of voting power. We emphasize the need for a unified approach to the study of a priori and actual voting power. We show that the family of 'strategic' measures proposed by some of the participants in the Symposium are a natural generalization of the Banzhaf measure.

The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /07/2001 Português
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We analyse and evaluate three decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU, which are prescribed by the 'definitive form' of the Treaty of Nice. The first will apply from 2005 to the present 15-member EU, if it will not have been enlarged by then. The second or third will apply to an enlarged 27-member EU. We conclude that the first of these is an improvement on the current decision rule; but the other two have extremely undesirable features.

Annexations and alliances : when are blocs advantageous a priori?

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /04/2002 Português
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For any simple voting game (SVG), we consider the question posed in the title from two different points of view as to what voting power means. We also distinguish between blocs imposed by annexation and those formed voluntarily, and present some general theoretical results concerning these notions. We illustrate our theoretical findings with examples using both toy SVGs and the Qualified Majority Voting rule of the Council of Ministers of the European Community (CMEC). We show that when voting power is understood as influence (I-power), forming a voluntary bloc may be advantageous even if its voting power is smaller than the sum of the original powers of its members; and it may be disadvantageous even if its voting power is greater than that sum.

The voting power approach : response to a philosophical reproach

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /12/2003 Português
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A priori voting power : what is it all about?

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /01/2004 Português
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In this account, we explain the meaning of a priori voting power and outline how it is measured. We distinguish two intuitive notions as to what voting power means, leading to two approaches to measuring it. We discuss some philosophical and pragmatic objections, according to which a priori (as distinct from actual) voting power is worthless or inapplicable.

L.S. Penrose's limit theorem : proof of some special cases

Lindner, Ines; Machover, Moshé
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /01/2004 Português
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LS Penrose was the first to propose a measure of voting power (which later came to be known as ‘the [absolute] Banzhaf index’). His limit theorem – which is implicit in Penrose (1952) and for which he gave no rigorous proof – says that, in simple weighted voting games, if the number of voters increases indefinitely while the quota is pegged at half the total weight, then – under certain conditions – the ratio between the voting powers (as measured by him) of any two voters converges to the ratio between their weights. We conjecture that the theorem holds, under rather general conditions, for large classes of variously defined weighted voting games, other values of the quota, and other measures of voting power. We provide proofs for some special cases.

Why so much centralization? A model of primitive centripetal accumulation

Faguet, Jean-Paul
Fonte: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science Publicador: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science
Tipo: Monograph; NonPeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /06/2004 Português
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With strong conceptual arguments in its favor, decentralization is a popular and growing policy trend across the world. And yet dozens of empirical studies have failed to find convincing evidence that past reforms have worked. This begs two questions: (1) Why does decentralization produce indifferent results? and (2) Why is there so much centralization in the first place? The paper develops a simple model of a legislature in which municipal representatives bargain with central government agents over the allocation of public resources. By locating central government in a particular geographic space - the "capital" - and invoking self-interest on the part of its residents, I can answer both questions. I introduce the concept of residual power, which underpins the model and determines the flow of resources to districts. There is so much centralization because residual power is located in the capital, whose residents directly benefit from weak local governments.

Anti-herding and strategic consultation

Levy, Gilat
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /06/2004 Português
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In this paper I analyze how careerist decision makers aggregate and use information provided by others. I find that decision makers who are motivated by reputation concerns tend to ‘anti-herding’, i.e., they excessively contradict public information such as the prior or others’ recommendations. I also find that some decision makers may deliberately act unilaterally and not consult advisers although advice is costless. Moreover, advisers to the decision maker may not report their information truthfully. Even if the advisers care only about the outcome, they bias their recommendation since they anticipate inefficient anti-herding behavior by the decision maker.

Voting power in the Bretton Woods institutions

Leech, Dennis; Leech, Robert
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Conference or Workshop Item; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /09/2003 Português
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The Bretton Woods institutions have systems of governance based on weighted voting. Each member possesses a number of votes which depends on its quota allocation and which must be cast as a bloc. This leads to a problem of democratic legitimacy since a member's influence or voting power within such decision making systems does not in general correspond to its voting weight. This paper uses voting power analysis to show that weighted voting tends to further enhance the power of the United States at the expense of all other members in both the board of Governors and the Executive board. It goes on to investigate the proposal to increase the ‘basic’ votes to restore them to their original 1946 level and finds that the same effect occurs, although the representation of the poor countries is improved. A criticism that is frequently made is that the present constituency structure and voting weights work to enhance the power of the developed and creditor countries at the expense of the poor, and that many countries are effectively disenfranchised; when looked at from the voting power point of view there is evidence that the weighted voting system adds to this anti democratic bias and produces some unintended effects. We investigate the constituency system as a form of representative democracy and find that the system gives disproportionate power to small European countries...

Voting power and voting blocs

Leech, Dennis; Leech, Robert
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /06/2006 Português
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We use the method of power indices to analyse voting power of members of a hypothetical legislature that has voting blocs. We assume social actors are motivated by the pursuit of constitutional power as measured by objective power indices, following Riker (Behavioural Science, 1959, “A test of the adequacy of the power index”) and Coleman (American Sociological Review, 1973, “Loss of Power”). We apply the Penrose index (the absolute Banzhaf index) to a voting body with 100 members. We show how the power indices of individual bloc members can be used to study the implications of the formation of blocs and how voting power varies as bloc size varies. We argue that the Shapley-Shubik index is inapplicable to this context and show that the Shapley-Shubik index per head – which has been used in some studies -is inappropriate. We briefly consider incentives to migrate between blocs. This technique of analysis has many real world applications to legislatures and international bodies. It can be generalised in a number of ways: our analysis is a priori, assuming formal voting and ignoring actual voting behaviour, but can be made empirical with voting data reflecting behaviour; the paper examines the consequences of two blocs but can easily be extended to more.

Are left-wing party strength and corporatism good for the environment? Evidence from panel analysis of air pollution in OECD countries

Neumayer, Eric
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /06/2003 Português
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The effect of left-wing party strength and corporatism on air pollution levels in up to 21 OECD countries over the period 1980 or 1990 to 1999 is tested with both fixed-effects and random-effects estimators. Controlling for scale, composition, technique as well as aggregate time effects, robust evidence is found that parliamentary green/left-libertarian party strength is associated with lower pollution levels. The rise of ecologically oriented parties has thus had a real impact on air pollution levels. Traditional left-wing party strength is possibly also associated with lower pollution levels, but the evidence is less consistent and robust. Combined left-wing party strength in government is possibly associated with higher pollution levels, but this result is also far from robust and is practically small. No evidence is found for a consistent systematic impact of corporatism on pollution levels.

The problem with party finance : theoretical perspectives on the funding of party politics

Hopkin, Jonathan
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /11/2004 Português
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This article presents some theoretical contours for the study of party finance and its consequences. Two broad issues are explored. First, the article develops an account of changes in patterns of party finance, and in particular the move away from the ‘mass party’ model of funding towards ‘elite party’ and ‘cartel party’ models. Party finance is conceptualized as a collective action problem, and four ‘post-mass party’ financial strategies are identified. Second, the article addresses normative issues, assessing how these four financial models perform in terms of ‘liberal’ and ‘populist’ theories of democracy. It is concluded that the mass party model remains closest to the ‘democratic’ ideal, whilst the state-financed (‘cartel’) model is a reasonable pragmatic response to the decline in party membership.

Voting power in the governance of the International Monetary Fund

Leech, Dennis
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /01/2002 Português
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In general in an organisation whose system of governance involves weighted voting, a member's weight in terms of the number of votes and the formal power it represents differ. Power indices provide a means of analysing this difference. The paper uses new algorithms for computing power indices for large games. Three analyses are carried out: (1) the distribution of Banzhaf voting power among members in 1999; the results show that the United States has considerably more power over ordinary decisions than its weight of 17% but that the use of special supermajorities limits its power; (2) the effect of varying the majority requirement on the power of the IMF to act and the powers of members to prevent and initiate action (Coleman indices); the results show the effect of supermajorities severely limits the power to act and therefore renders the voting system ineffective in democratic terms, also the sovereignty of the United States within the IMF is effectively limited to just the power of veto; (3) the paper proposes the determination of the weights instrumentally by means of an iterative algorithm to give the required power distribution; this would be a useful procedure for determining appropriate changes in weights consequent on changes to individual countries' quotas; this is applied to the 1999 data. Policy recommendations are...

A model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence

Dietrich, Franz; List, Christian
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /09/2004 Português
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Under the independence and competence assumptions of Condorcet’s classical jury model, the probability of a correct majority decision converges to certainty as the jury size increases, a seemingly unrealistic result. Using Bayesian networks, we argue that the model’s independence assumption requires that the state of the world (guilty or not guilty) is the latest common cause of all jurors’ votes. But often – arguably in all courtroom cases and in many expert panels – the latest such common cause is a shared ‘body of evidence’ observed by the jurors. In the corresponding Bayesian network, the votes are direct descendants not of the state of the world, but of the body of evidence, which in turn is a direct descendant of the state of the world. We develop a model of jury decisions based on this Bayesian network. Our model permits the possibility of misleading evidence, even for a maximally competent observer, which cannot easily be accommodated in the classical model. We prove that (i) the probability of a correct majority verdict converges to the probability that the body of evidence is not misleading, a value typically below 1; (ii) depending on the required threshold of ‘no reasonable doubt’, it may be impossible...

Even if the Liberal Democrats vote to oust the Conservatives before 2015 a new general election is still unlikely

Pack, Mark
Fonte: Blog post from London School of Economics & Political Science Publicador: Blog post from London School of Economics & Political Science
Tipo: Website; NonPeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 02/01/2012 Português
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Up until this parliament, the date of parliamentary elections could be set by the Prime Minister of the day; now as part of the coalition agreement, election dates are set for every 5 years. In spite of this new rule, Mark Pack looks at the ways that we might seen an election before 2015, and finds that given the current electoral math and polling, such an outcome is unlikely.

The Coalition Government has only a 1 in 3 chance of lasting its term. Statistical modelling predicts its fall in October 2014

Hanretty, Chris
Fonte: Blog post from London School of Economics & Political Science Publicador: Blog post from London School of Economics & Political Science
Tipo: Website; NonPeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 23/02/2012 Português
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There has been much recent talk about the possibility of the Coalition government falling before the parliamentary term is up. Chris Hanretty uses a quantitative statistical model to suggest that this is indeed probable, and that the best prediction indicates the government will fall in October 2014.

The coalition is at least as likely to end up shipwrecked as it is to sail through, or at least stay afloat, until 2015

Bale, Tim
Fonte: Blog post from London School of Economics & Political Science Publicador: Blog post from London School of Economics & Political Science
Tipo: Website; NonPeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 27/02/2012 Português
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Liberal Democrat MPs may soon find themselves watching a slow motion car crash while their Conservative counterparts might feel that their ‘business arrangement’ has served its purpose. Either way, a parliamentary full-term, while not impossible, remains less likely than an early and potentially messy, dénouement, writes Tim Bale.

Book review: beyond liberal democracy: political thinking for an East Asian context. by Daniel A. Bell and multiculturalism in Asia. edited by Will Kymlicka and Baogang He

Jenco, Leigh K.
Fonte: Cambridge University Press Publicador: Cambridge University Press
Tipo: Article; NonPeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /03/2009 Português
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