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17.871 Political Science Laboratory, Spring 2002; Political Science Laboratory
17.100J / 14.781J / 15.678J Political Economy I: Theories of the State and the Economy, Fall 2002; Political Economy I: Theories of the State and the Economy
Australian political science and the study of discourse
Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies
Political Charisma Revisited, and Reclaimed for Political Science
Interest Group Politics in the European Union: Migrant Inclusion Organizations and Political Behavior Across Levels of Governance
Wedge politics and welfare reform in Australia
'To do justice and judgement' : the place of passion in public life
Electoral Institutions, Party Organizations, and Political Instability
A majority of formal theoretic research in political science treats political parties as unitary actors, and endows them with decision-making powers not unlike those of strategic individuals. This is true both of most research in the spatial-theoretic tradition, as well as most game theoretic research in the field of comparative political-economy. In contrast, my dissertation examines strategic equilibria which arise when competition takes place simultaneously within parties over organizational control and between parties over political office. I first distinguish between three intra-organizational elements: a party's parliamentary group, its activist cadre, and its executive leaders. Chapters 2-4 develop a set of foundational game theoretic models which identify the equilibrium balance of power among these 3 organizational elements as a function of a country's electoral institutions and voters' relative responsiveness to marginal policy changes. In turn, this more complete understanding of intra-party competition sheds light on a number of important questions in comparative politics and comparative political-economy. For example, it helps to identify conditions under which Downsian vote-maximization is in fact a viable assumption in spatial theoretic models; conditions under which Duverger's argument that proportional representation (PR) should tend to generate multi-party competition may not apply; and...