Embedded consensus has characterised the behaviour of the European Parliament since its foundation in the 1950s. This research tests the path dependence of consensus during the period of 1994 to 2002, in the light of the changing institutional powers of the Parliament. It challenges existing theory and empirical evidence drawn mainly from roll call votes that has concluded that the European Parliament has become more competitive internally in response to increased institutional powers. There are three causal factors that reinforce consensus: the need to reconcile national and ideological divisions within a multinational political system; the pull of external institutional factors such as institutional change or the separation of powers; and internal incentives for collusion between political actors influenced by the need to accommodate the interests of the national elites present at the level of the European Union. Switzerland, a multiple cleavage system of decentralised federalism that includes consociational characteristics and a separation of powers, provides a comparative reference point for institutionalised consensus. The hypotheses of institutionalised consensus are tested empirically in four ways: 1) by roll call votes between 1994 and 2001...

The thesis sets forth a model relating political contention to technological development. The selective realisation of a technical potentiality is shown to have been determined by conflict and negotiation among shifting alliances of state and private-industrial entities, each attempting to impose its requirements upon an emergent technology and thereby to dictate the precise form and pace of technical development. The 'course of communications satellite development is examined during the technology's formative period from 1961 to 1975--as the product of struggles over technological control. Negotiation centered upon control, and contending modes of technical development were promoted and opposed on the basis of their perceived consequences upon the distribution of effective control over the technology. The initial mode of satellite development lasted from 1961 to 1971 and is characterised as pre-emptive underdevelopment; urgency and haste were combined with tight constraints on the qualitative breadth allowed to technological articulation. Pre-emptive underdevelopment derived from an uneasy political accommodation struck among constituencies dominant during this phases the U.S. government, American communications carrier industry and a Western European intergovernmental bloc. The reigning compromise was directed toward expediting satellite development sufficiently to forestall rival deployments without endangering existing and anticipated interests in both satellite and competitive technologies. Technical development beneath a minimum level risked undermining the regime of control by leaving open the possibility of rival satellite systems; but development beyond a maximum level would have harmed the outstanding industrial and political interests in whose defence control was sought...

A burgeoning literature argues that the abundance of oil in developing countries strengthens autocratic rule and erodes democracy. However, extant studies either show the average cross-national correlation between oil and political regime or develop particularistic accounts that do not easily lend themselves to theorizing. Consequently, we know little of the causal mechanisms that potentially link oil wealth to undemocratic outcomes and the conditions that would help explain the ultimate, not average, effect of oil on political regime. This study develops a conditional theory of the “political resource curse.” It does so by undertaking a statistical reassessment of the relationship between oil wealth and political regime and a nuanced qualitative examination of a set of carefully selected cases in order to contribute to developing an adequate account of causal mechanisms that transmit and conditions that shape the relationship between oil abundance and autocracy. It draws on qualitative and quantitative evidence collected over eighteen months of fieldwork in oil-rich former Soviet countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, and the ‘counterfactual’ oil-poor Kyrgyzstan. Employing a theoretical framework that draws on insights from the rentier state theory...