Individual transferable quota (ITQ) institutions should be designed to minimize two types of transaction costs. First, to minimize the costs of transferring ITQ rights among rights-holders and users, rights should be separated into three components: a permanent entitlement share, an annual catch allocation, and a license to fish. Second, ITQ rights can reduce the transactions costs for development of self-governance by owners both by specifying a non-unanimous voting rule (preferably one-share/one-vote) and also by delineating clear standards for devolution of responsibility from government. These same two principles for reduction of transactions costs can be applied, with slight variation, to individual transferable input systems.; http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/30453/description#description; Ralph E. Townsend, James McColl and Michael D. Young
In spite of a successful introduction of individual transferable quotas in many fisheries, governments continue to intensively manage these fisheries. Setting and enforcing sensible fisheries management rules is, of course, crucial for a good economic performance of the fishing activity. On the other hand, it is well known that governments, due to fundamental problems of information and incentives, tend to be inefficient providers of services in general. Indeed, the fisheries management conducted by many governments has been found to be both ineffective and expensive. In this paper it is shown that that under an ITQ system, the holders of ITQs are well placed to conduct the necessary fisheries management functions themselves. Moreover, there are many indications that they are able to provide these services substantially more efficiently than the government. It is further shown that the ITQ holders are able to co-ordinate their interests with those of other users of fish stocks, such as recreational fishermen and conservationists, in an economically efficient manner.; JRC.G.4-Maritime affairs
The decline of the world's fisheries and the inability of traditional management frameworks to maintain them, has led managers to adopt alternative management frameworks. The use of dedicated access privileges have often been shown to have varying popularity among factions within the commercial fishing industry and managers. Here, we examine commercial fishers' preference for alternative management frameworks in the context of a unique multispecies fisheries of the Florida Keys. By surveying commercial fishers, we find that that the size of operation plays no role in affecting fisher perception regarding dedicated access privileges. Furthermore, fishers who are organized are less likely to support dedicated access privilege frameworks. Overall, we do not find enough support in the fishing industry for the implementation of dedicated access privileges in the Florida Keys. These findings can provide inputs in developing effective management plans in the region.
Fonte: Oxford University PressPublicador: Oxford University Press
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
There is a need to understand the potential impacts on ecosystems and economies from shifting fisheries management towards individual transferable quota (ITQ) programmes. Multispecies fisheries present the challenge of understanding spatial patterns in fi
Regulators in many countries have adopted individual transferable quotas as a means of dealing with the open access problem inherent in fisheries. Using individual vessel data prior to and after the introduction of ITQs in Canada's multi-species Scotia-Fundy mobile gear fishery, the paper uses an index number profit decomposition to compare vessel performance over time and across individual vessels. The approach allows us to undertake both an ex post evaluation of short-term impacts of ITQs and an ex ante evaluation of longer term impacts. With respect to short-term impacts, the results suggest that larger vessels have benefited the most from the introduction of ITQs, but that all vessels have enjoyed increases in the prices received for those fish species that are included in the quota program. With respect to longer-term impacts, the transferability provisions of the ITQ program have encouraged exit and more efficient operations to prevail.